Archive for November, 2005

Nov 27 2005

Does Public Opinion Count in the Middle East?

Published by Daoud Kuttab under Articles

Does Public Opinion Matter in the

Middle East ?

Daoud Kuttab     Al-Hayat     - 21/11/05//



The Palestinian Israeli conflict is very strange. It has lasted so long that public opinion has lost its power to affect policy or leaders’ decision making. No matter what the Palestinian or Israeli public wants, what happens on the ground and in decision making circles in Tel Aviv and Ramallah rarely reflects public opinion.

 

If public opinion counted we would long ago have solved this conflict. It is a scientific fact that the majority of Palestinians and Israelis know exactly what the solution to the conflict will look like:  two sovereign states roughly along the 1967 borders, some adjustments for the big settlement blocks, a few refugees returning for symbolic value, and a functional solution for

Jerusalem .

 

But public opinion doesn’t count. Just look at the victims of those who tried to follow public opinion. Quite a few PLO representatives who wanted to reflect Palestinian public opinion by beginning dialogue with Israelis were assassinated. A popular Israeli prime minister who was doing what the majority of Israelis wanted was similarly killed. In both instances the killers were not from the other side, but from their own people. Yasser Arafat and his Israeli counter parts had to negotiate in secret to reach the Oslo Accords. And Yasser Arafat told

Clinton
that he would be killed if he agreed on the ideas that Barak was offering. Ariel Sharon had to have an exaggerated number of body guards to protect him from assassination while he was enforcing what polls showed was a popular decision to withdraw from Gaza. He has not been able to do anything else despite polls showing that any further withdrawals in the

West Bank would also gain majority support from Israelis.

 

The reasons for the lack of effectiveness of public opinion vary. For issues that are of higher national and strategic interests, the public gives those in power much more leeway. The average person in the

Middle East feels that those in power have a lot more information at their disposal than they do that will allow them to decide what is best for the nation. The public might argue with authority on almost any issue except subjects dealing with security and of national strategic importance. Leaders are given the benefit of the doubt in these areas and their judgment is rarely questioned.

 

Unfortunately, leaders take advantage of this public position. They tend to carry out decisions reflecting what they want, assured that the public will rarely question them on issues relating to security.

 

This issue is more felt in the case of

Israel
. As a young country that was established against many odds, the Israeli public has an exaggerated sense of faith in their security forces. And since the majority of the Israeli political leaders have come from the army, the public has blind support for whatever their leaders have to say in security related matters. And while the Israeli public will question almost any other decision, they tend to be unanimously silent on strategic issues or security related subjects.

 

Before completely trashing the importance of public opinion even on security-related issues, let me partially retract my total dismissal of public opinion. In normal societies, when someone talks about public opinion they are talking about issues that have the support of say 55 or 60% of the public. But in the

Middle East , for public opinion to really count it must top 2/3 of the majority, or even more.

 

When the  majority of Israelis protested against the Sabra and Shatilla massacres the government had to respond. When the vast majority of Palestinians opposed the Qassam rockets launched after the explosion during the Hamas parade, the leaders of the Islamic movement quickly retracted and unilaterally declared a stoppage of the attacks.

 

If regular public opinion doesn’t matter, what is it that does count? The way to make change in the

Middle East is in one of two ways. With the first method, an effort is made to reach overwhelming public support in any one community. To do that, activists will need to lower their expectations and agree on the common denominator that will produce overwhelming public support. The only other way is for outside pressure to be exerted on leaders. We saw this in the case of the Gaza withdrawals as the international pressure on Sharon to move in the peace process (within the Road Map framework) forced him to come up with a political plan that received the approval of the White House, even though it didn’t have overwhelming support in

Israel
.

Change in the

Middle East conflict will not happen simply by a slight improvement in public opinion. Only when other key elements of change are lined up and an overwhelming transformation in public opinion takes place can we expect substantial change in this protracted conflict.

-

 

Daoud Kutab is a Palestinian journalist and the director of the

Institute of

Modern Media
at Al Quds University in Ramallah. This article is part of a series of views on "The Dynamics of Public Opinion", published in partnership with the Common Ground News Service (CGNews).

 

 

 

No responses yet

Nov 23 2005

WSIS in Tunis

Published by Daoud Kuttab under Blogs

Thursday November 17

It only occurred to me while waiting for the fog to clear up in the plane on the Queen Alia Airport . Seated next to me in the Air France flight to Paris was Washington Post bureau chief in the French capital John Anderson. When he asked me why I was going through Paris to get to Tunis , I realized that this was yet another example of the plague that has been infecting the Arab world. Jordan has a daily flight to Paris and other European capitals but once a week flight to neighboring Arab state Tunis . And this was not a problem with Jordan, my travel agent failed to find anything in nearby Arab countries for a connecting flight to Tunisia . If Arabs are one day expected to raise the level of inter Arab business from the current single digit levels, the very least will require daily flight from and to the major capitals of the countries that make the Arab world.

Continue Reading »

No responses yet

Nov 22 2005

After the Amman bombings

Published by Daoud Kuttab under Articles




Contrary to impulsive thinking, the real challenge to Jordan following the triple hotel bombing is not a security one. Blessed with a strong internal security apparatus, and a relatively homogeneous population, Jordan’s King Abdullah II has few strategic security issues to worry about. His real challenge is a socioeconomic one.

True, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan received a painful dose of violence on November 9, when pro-al-Qaida Iraqi bombers detonated themselves in three hotels killing 58 and injuring over 100. But for the young Jordanian monarch the real challenge is whether or not this incident will sway him away from the political, social and economic reform process that has been recently set in motion.

The key instrument of this reform is the National Agenda process that was set to be made public the week the Iraqi bombers succeeded in disturbing the kingdom’s tranquility.

Until those attacks, Jordan had a remarkable success at maintaining security, considering that it lives in a very violent and turbulent neighborhood. Many credit the country’s tough and highly professional general security directorate with having miraculously kept the country safe through the two Palestinian intifadas to the west, and the three wars in Iraq to the east.

Yet effective as the security services have been, it is clear now that it is not enough to depend on the software of intelligence. Shortly after the bombings Jordan accepted the inevitable and placed metal detectors and other hardware assets at the entrance to major hotels, shopping centers, government and public locations.

The internal fiber of the country is also quite well protected. The fact that the Jordanian-born Zarqawi had to depend on Iraqis coming from Iraqi to carry out the attack is proof that he has been unsuccessful in recruiting within Jordan. Furthermore, the strong public reaction to the bombings shows that the home front is quite intact. Political groups from right to left, from Islamists to secularists all publicly condemned the attack in a clear sign of national unity.

But while this initial public support reflects a unified national front, there is no telling how strong and reliable this support will be.

POLITICALLY, JORDAN has a lot of reform left to do. The governing ethos of the kingdom has been based on the support of the major tribal families. Using a voting system that largely favors this tribal minority the kingdom has ensured loyalty and support to the successive Hashemite monarchs, but has not instituted a true representative democracy.

Political parties have been kept weak and freedoms kept in check by a strong security apparatus made up largely of the same loyal tribal families. This was a successful formula in the 1950s and ’60s but it is hardly a potent arrangement for a modern state with a young educated population.

The economic situation, while slightly improving under the reign of Abdullah, is still very fragile. Poverty and unemployment are still rampant especially in the areas outside the country’s major cities. Socially a culture of dependency, based on the government providing easy desk jobs (especially for east bank Jordanians), is still a major cause for worry. And as the country’s huge youth population enters the job market social problems will make the bombings seem like a picnic.

While this oil-less desert kingdom’s strength is its rather educated human resources it is suffering from an overblown public sector and outdated economic priorities.

Take agriculture. This water-deficient country has a huge agriculture sector depleting the country’s water resources to produce cheaply-priced products that keep the farmers forever poor and dependent on the central government for public services.

A Jordanian team led by Deputy Prime Minister Marwan Muasher has been tackling many of these political, social and economic reforms and is expected to present its national agenda to the king any day now. Among other things this document seeks to set the country’s reform agenda for the next 10 years.

The expected plan will include a call for a major reform of the political process in favor of a more representative government, an overhaul of media policies toward genuine freedom of expression, and a road map for improving the country’s economic state. It will lay out measurable goals with a schedule for their achievement. Early leaks of the plan evoked mixed reactions, with many groups who have benefited from the current policies voicing angry opposition.

King Abdullah II has a big responsibility on his shoulders following the recent bombings. While his short-term concerns will certainly focus on how to protect the country and its people, he must use the tremendous public support he has received to take on the long-term reform challenges the National Agenda attempts to tackle. This will be the best gift he can give Jordanians, and it will be the most appropriate response to those choosing death over life.

The writer is a Palestinian journalist and director of the Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University in Ramallah.




No responses yet

Nov 10 2005

How do you tell a six year old

Published by Daoud Kuttab under Blogs

The problem in our household after the triple bombing in Amman was how to tell our six year old daughter, Dina. The urgency of the problem was because the Jordanian government had called for a day of mourning the following day and schools were expected to be closed. Because she is so inquisitive we knew that once we tell Dina there was no school in the morning she will want to know why.

 

No responses yet

Nov 07 2005

A vote for the future of Palestine

Published by Daoud Kuttab under Articles

By: Daoud Kuttab*

The biggest question in the upcoming elections for the Palestinian legislature is not how many seats Hamas will win. Nor are people questioning how the mixed elections (district and national) will play out. The real question on most Palestinian’s lips these days is who will represent the leading Palestinian party (movement).

Fateh, which prides itself as a liberation movement (my mistake of calling it a party got me a reprimand from Yasser Arafat) is witnessing a serious crisis. Ever since the death of its long-time leader, the movement has been experiencing a major internal struggle. It is not just a struggle between older and younger leaders, not just between Tunis-based leaders and those who have never left the occupied territories. While these are some of the problems, the real crisis stems from the lack of any attractive leadership. While many will be vying for the chance of being nominated by Fateh, it is not clear whether such an honour will be, as in the past, the guarantee of an election victory.

At a recent iftar dinner in Ramallah, I asked the head of the pro-Fateh lawyers union who he and his bar association were planning to support. “The only issue we have decided on is that we don’t want to reelect any of the existing members of the Palestine Legislative Council (PLC),” Ahmad Sayyad told me with leading members of the association nodding in agreement.

I found similar sentiments when I talked to Palestinians in other West Bank cities. Most agreed that there is a strong popular desire to bring in new faces and use the elections to make some radical changes in Palestinian political life. But while the desire to make a political blood change exists, it is difficult to see how this change will take place. The Fateh local committees in various districts have began a process of enlisting members. Reliable sources assured me that there is no specific requirement to join Fateh, which is both a strength and a weakness. Any Palestinian of voting age is eligible to join this movement and will be able to vote in the upcoming primaries which many Fateh members are hoping will be an effective mechanism in deciding on the upcoming list for the elections.

The primaries, however, are not working out the way the movement is planning. The fact that Fateh considers any Palestinian not affiliated with an existing party to be Fateh material doesn’t necessarily mean that these individuals will join Fateh lists. Many individuals who are popular in their district have yet to agree to join a Fateh list despite being woed by some of the Fateh leadership. Without some big names who can make a strong showing, the primary system might work against Fateh, because once internal primaries take place, those who will be elected will expect, indeed insist to be on the Fateh list.

On the other hand, strong individuals who will have a better chance and who would be willing to join a Fateh list (without having to go through the grinding fight of the primaries) will not be able to participate.

There are ideas of having the Fateh list consist of a mix of some individuals elected internally and others chosen by the leadership. But the leadership is so divided without a strong person like Arafat to keep it united that many are worried that the entire process will weaken rather than strengthen the movement.

The Palestinian national movement has been led for years by Fateh and its long-time leader, Arafat. The absence of the old man, as many of his colleagues used to call him, is sorely felt these days within the movement. In the past, divisions within Fateh would always disappear once a major crisis threatened the movement.

Some Palestinian analysts familiar with the movement expect its members to pull together and push aside internal conflict as the day for elections comes closer. The fear of losing power can be a strong force that unites a divided movement.

Arafat was able to lead the movement and was often successful in pulling the rabbits out of a hat. Mahmoud Abbas has yet to show anything close to the leadership abilities of his predecessor, especially behind closed doors. Abu Mazen has repeatedly expressed the desire to do things differently and to allow for genuine democratic mechanisms to determine who will run.

While it might be too early to say now how the Fateh movement will deal with these challenges, the election in late January will certainly be as much a vote for Fateh as a vote for the future of Palestine.

* Daoud Kuttab is a Palestinian columnist and the irector of the Institute of Modern Media at Al Quds University in Ramall

No responses yet