After years of gloom, Palestine woke up this week to a celebration never before witnessed. Huge signs of leading candidates to presidency have replaced posters of martyrs and Intifada graffiti. Local newspapers are also full of advertisements with headlines like: “Ending the occupation”, “Security for the citizen”, “Reform and development” (Mahmoud Abbas). Or Tayseer Khaled’s — the candidate for change — “No peace without Jerusalem which is the jewel of the nation and the root of our existence”. The candidate of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine even advertises his e-mail and website: www.vote-tayseer.com.



If you are travelling from Ramallah to Jerusalem, and just before you reach the Qalandia checkpoint, you are greeted by the face of Bassam Salahi, the candidate of the People’s Party, with Jerusalem in the background, insisting that if elected, he will insist on the inclusion of Jerusalem in the Palestinian state.



Mustafa Barghouthi’s face is also all over sidewalks and billboards. His election campaign calls on voters to “put the case (meaning the Palestinian case) in trustworthy hands”. Barghouthi, however, has been ahead of all the other candidates in using satellite Arab television stations to advertise his campaign.



An unusual candidate for the elections is Dr Abdel Halim Ashqar who is under house arrest in the United States. He is hoping to get votes from Islamists by advertising that he is an independent Islamic candidate. His campaign slogan is: “They have restricted my movement but they can’t restrict my voice.”



While many candidates talk about continuing the legacy of Yasser Arafat, Abu Mazen is the only one with photos with the late president and the subheadline talking about their lifetime comradeship.



The wall and settlements feature in many advertisements, with many candidates insisting that they are opposed to the wall, to settlements and to land confiscation.



The news pages are also full of reports of this candidate visiting this location and this community or group supporting him.



Elections in Jerusalem are also the talk of the town. Unlike in 1996, this time around, there seems to be a much higher interest many Palestinians in Jerusalem have in voting. This excitement is felt mostly among the young people, many of whom will be voting for the first time in their lives, especially since they don’t participate in the elections for the Jerusalem Municipality organized by the Israelis.



A strong victory for Mahmoud Abbas will be a clear change in direction for the Palestinian national cause. Unlike the expectations of some, the rhetoric of Abu Mazen with regards to his opposition to the militarization of the Intifada has not been diluted since the election campaign began. In fact, at least in one closed meeting with 160 businessmen in Ramallah, the front runner for the post of president said that there must be a clear end to the Intifada. And while other candidates are promising the electorate the moon, Abu Mazen has not even spoken of the word right of return, choosing, instead, to say that he is in favor of a just solution to the refugee problem agreed to by the two sides and in accordance to UN Resolution 194.



Abbas has also cancelled a favorite political term of the previous leadership, the Arabic word “thawbet”, which means the immovable issues, used in reference to issues like Jerusalem and refugees. For the current chairman of the PLO, politics can’t be frozen and one must be flexible. Instead, of the “thawbet”, Abu Mazen says he prefers the word “rights in accordance to international law”.



The general discussion, however, is centered much more on the next phase of the political process; discussions these days are centered on the post-Jan. 9 elections whose winner is clear in most everybody’s mind. But while Abbas’ victory is all but assured, the two questions that are being discussed are what percentage he will get and who will be the number two winner, even though most believe it will be a distant second.



Changes are starting to appear in the Palestinian officialdom. Ahmed Qureia, the prime minister, is rarely appearing in the media and Saeb Erekat is also absent. Yosef Naser, a member of the Fateh Central Committee and a senior general from Gaza, seems to be on the rise these days, running the election campaign for Abu Mazen.



The election season has left a clear mark on the Palestinian population. It has allowed for some breathing space even though travel restrictions have not yet eased for Palestinians.



Most people discussing this upcoming period talk about the coming Abu Mazen administration and what it will do in terms of negotiations with the Israelis, restoration of the rule of law and personal security, and the general improvement in the quality of life. Much of the optimism is based on the general support that the international community has given to Abu Mazen.

I start this day with a previously arranged meeting with the former Jordanian foreign minister Marwan Muasher who is now deputy prime minister and minister for administrative affairs. He welcomes me in his huge office in the prime ministry and I can’t help but ask him if in fact he agrees with the description that his ministry is a super ministry as the head of the EU in Jordan describes it.

 We begin our discussions with that mornings news and I comment that the Prime Minister shouldn’t have made the statement he made the day before in parliament which today made the front page headlines. “I would ally myself with the devil if it will help my country” he is quoted as saying in defense of a recent economic agreement with the Israelis.

We move our discussions to the reason for the request of the meeting. “Is the media reform real or a mirage,” I ask sarcastically, and I explain to him the disappointment I was having with believing that media reform is real when a license for a local radio station, that I applied for has not been approved even though others have received a license. I also tell him about my failure to get a license for a magazine that deals with the social life of local Christian Arabs in Jordan and Palestine. He is sure that the delay is from some small bureaucrat and he promises to take this issue up directly with the head of the mukhabarat (general security services).

 I ask him if the head of the intelligence Saaed Kher is being groomed as the next prime minister especially since his photo appeared in the local papers the previous day. I don’t know, but I am hearing this more and more, he says 

We  shake hands on his promise to get back to me within a few days, I head to the bridge back to Palestine. 

Today my son, Bishara is supposed to be back. He just completed a long . long walk that began on December 23 in the Jordanian  archeological city of Jarash and ended in Bethlehem on Christmas. The idea was an abbreviation of a 2000 journey that tried to retrace the footsteps of the Magi.  On the 24^th he had walked a total of 30 kilometers from the Nabi Musa area to the Mar Saba Monastery 

For the past two days Bishara and I have argued. I wanted him to return to Amman on Sunday he wanted to stay one more day and come early on Monday. Well it took him an entire day just to make the normally 90 minute journeys from Jerusalem to Amman. He began Monday early, but it took him a long time at first to get to the Allenby Bridge. At the bridge he was delayed for two hours while he waited in the Israeli terminal with nothing to do. 

The Jordanians were no less cooperating. By the time he got to the Jordanian side, the Jordanians refused him entry for no clear reason. They claimed that the reason they returned him was the fact that he didn’t have a permit which meant that if they would allow him to cross they would somehow be contributing to the emptiness of Palestinian of Palestinians. The fact that he had a valid reentry permit on his US passport failed to sway them as they have been drilled only to recognize the tasreeh (permit) and nothing else.

By the time Bishara got back to the Israeli side there were no buses. He was also out of money. He called me up at work with the last five shekels to his names (the kiosk at the bridge charged that much for a one minute local call). I tried to get him to cross again and to buy the stupid permit that the Jordanians want (which costs with the exit tax an exobirant 280 shekels -$70), but by this time around 2:30 there were no more buses. I called the Israeli bridge manager Gidi, and his assistant, but they both could not do anything. Even though the bridge is open till 4 pm, they are unable to find a way for him to cross. The only option is the VIP service, which is a further $80.

 I call Bishara again on the cell phone of one of the taxi drivers at the bridge. I  instruct him to take the shared taxi to Jerusalem and have the taxi stop by a mutual friend so that they can pay for it.

 At 4:30 I finish work and rush to Jerusalem. On the way, my cell phone has an SMS message from my wife, Salam, where is Bishara? I quickly realize that I had not told her what had happened. I reply quickly that he is with me and will be coming soon.

 I drive to Jerusalem, Bishara comes along, we buy a sandwich and drive the long way all the way up to Beit Shaan (Bisan) where the northern bridge between Jordan and Israel is. This bridge which is open till 10 allows people, like Bishara with a US passport to cross, and the Jordanians happily give you a visa for 10JD. The trip gives me a chance to spend a few hours alone with my son.  Recalling how he felt when he returned and the Israelis refused to reimburse him the 130 shekels exit tax, Bishara says to me “It hurts when you don’t have money.” He tells me among other things that his walk to Bethlehem and his meetings with the 10 other foreigners also walking has taught him something important. I learned not to be prejudice, he tells me. I am not sure regarding what he is talking, but I assume it is about Israelis, because I have been worried about how hateful he had been lately about Jews and Israelis.

I arrive at about 7pm. Give Bishara plenty of money and let him go. Half an hour later, I call the bus driver, Nael (whose number I have from previous trips.) He confirms that Bishara made it ok. By 8:30 I am back in Jerusalem for a short visit to my brother in law Labib where I find out that the Palestinian Bible Society (which he heads) was robbed, computers, digital camera, dvd and petty cash was stolen. Apparently a sense of lawlessness is spreading in Beit Hanina. Two other robberies took place the week before.

 At 10pm I am at my Jerusalem apartment and at 10:20pm almost 14 hours after he left our Jerusalem house, Bishara arrives home in Amman, tired, but still had to spend a few hours studying for an exam the next day.

Midway through an exclusive interview I had with Yasser Arafat in Tunis shortly before his return to Palestine, a year or so after the signing of the Oslo accords, I asked him to comment on some of the PLO factions wanting to become a political party.

“Why not?” was his quick answer.



I felt confident enough to pursue my idea with a follow up question. But when I posed the question about Fateh becoming a party, the earth shook. Arafat became extremely angry, he said that my interview was terminated, and his bodyguards confiscate my tape recorder. When I tried to find out what angered him, I was given a long lecture on what Fateh is all about.



“Fateh can’t become a party, it is a liberation movement. It represents all Palestinians wanting to be free. Amongst its members are left-wing communists and right-wing Islamists. We are not into ideology or a narrow political platform, we are a people’s movement.”



The interview with Arafat had been arranged by some of my friends who had been deported during the first Intifada. They were sitting in with me for the interview. They were Marwan Barghouthi, Samir Sbeihat and Jibril Rajoub. The first two had been presidents of the student body at Bir Zeit and I had known Rajoub from his days at Faisal Husseini’s Arab Studies Centre where he worked after his release from a 19-year jail term.



I later realized that Arafat was, of course, not interested in me but much more interested in sending a message to the three Palestinians from the occupied territories. The three, and especially Barghouthi, had been talking to me in the days before the interview about their idea that Fateh should become a party once they return.



I remembered this story as I followed closely Barghouthi’s on and off nomination. What I found interesting was the public and private negotiations that were taking place before Barghouthi’s final decision to withdraw his candidacy. Another interesting story for me was a 12-point political platform that Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) is said to have drawn up and which the head of his election campaign, Tayeb Abdelrahim, told Fateh leaders will be available to them on Jan. 26, which is the official date for the starting of the presidential election campaign. Even the issue of a debate was not discounted.



When asked if he would agree to a televised debate, Abu Mazen said yes. Our television station in Ramallah, Al Quds Education Television, has quickly picked up on this statement and suggested a debate, on Jan. 28, for all the candidates.



In the first presidential elections, there was neither platform nor televised debates. And the period that followed reflected Arafat’s feelings that Fateh was still part of a liberation movement and that Palestine was not yet a free and sovereign state in which his movement can decide whether to convert to a modern-day political party with a specific ideological position on economic and social issues. This ambiguity between liberation methodology and national politics is perhaps the most telling difference between Arafat and the Israelis, and between Arafat and the present Palestinian leadership.



Barghouthi and Abu Mazen insist on the need for the Palestinians to continue some sort of resistance activity until Palestine is fully free and sovereign. Abbas’ consistent position, before he ran for president and during his presidential campaign, on the need to stop the militarization of the Intifada can be compared by some as different from Barghouthi’s who feels that violent resistance might be necessary if the Israelis fail to quit their occupation of Palestinian lands.



As a strong executive president, Arafat had little time or room for a strong parliament. He was forced against his will to accept the concept of a prime minister, and soon after Abu Mazen was given this position, he was not very supportive (nor where the Israelis at the time) and finally Abbas resigned.



From the discussions we are hearing inside Fateh, there is still no consensus on the movement being converted (at present) into a political party. Certainly, with the hawkish Farouk Kaddoumi as its head, this will not happen any time soon. The question that needs to be asked is whether, once elected, Abu Mazen will make decisions and lead his movement in a direction that will prepare the grounds for it to become a party. Two important dates will answer that question. The legislative elections planned for next May and the convening of the sixth general assembly set for next August.



An Israeli withdrawal from Gaza by that time will also prove the need for political party-like economic and social policies, making them much more important and urgent.

Everyone in the Middle East is crossing their fingers these days, hoping that regional and international leaders will not blow yet another opportunity for Arab-Israeli peace. The role of Palestinian and Israeli leaders is clearly an important factor in moving the peace process ahead, but let there be no mistake about it: The crucial factor is 6,000 miles away from Jerusalem, in Washington.



The United States has as much power to change the situation in the Middle East as do local leaders, if not more. What is at stake is not only peace between Palestinians and Israelis, but also the resolution of Israel’s conflicts with Syria and Lebanon, not to mention America’s quagmire in Iraq. Suffice it to say, the consequences for the United States in the region are huge.



The current optimism stems from a number of developments, including Israel’s planned withdrawal from Gaza, the willingness of Syrian President Bashar Assad to drop any preconditions for peace talks with Israel, and the ongoing discussions among Palestinian Islamic movements for a long-term hudna, or cease-fire, with Israel. Without question, however, what woke up the dormant peace process was the unexpected death last month of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.



Arafat’s sudden exit from the Middle East stage relieved many local, regional and world leaders from the inextricable dilemma in which they had found themselves, foremost among them Prime Minister Sharon and President Bush. The Israeli leader and his recently reelected American ally had climbed a tree from which they were unable to come down, by striking the undemocratic position of excluding the popular and elected leader of the Palestinian people from any peace talks.



Many Palestinians believe that the Israeli and American shunning of Arafat was a convenient tool for not dealing with the "final-status" issues of borders, Jewish settlements, Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees. Now that Arafat is gone, it remains to be seen whether it was indeed his personal policies that proved to be the main impediment to Israeli and American participation in the peace process.



On the surface, at least, Israel and the United States should have no such reservations about Mahmoud Abbas, the current head of the PLO and overwhelming favorite in the Palestinian presidential elections scheduled for January 9. During their four decades together at the helm of the Palestinian national movement, Abbas and Arafat have differed in both style and content.



Abbas looks and talks in a more business-like manner, an important character trait that will be vital in the difficult process of changing public opinion in Israel and the United States. More importantly, Abbas has stated publicly that the militarization of the intifada it unacceptable because it has distorted resistance against an armed occupier into acts of violence against civilians, as well as into other abuses within Palestinian society. Arafat, by contrast, felt that armed resistance is an internationally guaranteed right, and that Israel’s failure to respect international treaties and its continued illegal settlement activity left Palestinians no choice but to use violence to end the Israeli occupation.



But it would be a mistake to believe that Abbas will differ from Arafat — and from the vast majority of Palestinians — when it comes to the core issues of the conflict. Regardless of who sits across the negotiating table, Israel will find strong opposition to any plan that will cede Palestinian territory within the 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem.



On the other hand, the Palestinian refugee issue, while important on a symbolic level, will not be a deal breaker. Palestinians are more interested in Israel recognizing its historic and moral role in causing the refugee problem than in insisting that every single refugee now living in the West Bank, Gaza or abroad be allowed to return to their former homes inside the State of Israel.



The issue on which Palestinians are perhaps most split is not an issue at all, but rather the pace of the negotiating process through which they are resolved. Some Palestinians are sick and tired of interim solutions and phased withdrawals. They remember the optimism that greeted the famous Rabin-Arafat handshake during the 1993 White House ceremony. To many Palestinians, the five-year interim plan that followed the 1993 handshake did nothing but cement the occupation, turning it into a permanent fact on the ground.



Other Palestinians, fearing that the negative effects of the four-year-long violent intifada will not easily be erased, worry that signing a permanent agreement now will be disadvantageous to Palestinians. An interim solution including a settlement freeze, they believe, will allow for the rebuilding of the Palestinian economy, a return to something approximating normal life and more time for Palestinians to extract a better negotiating position.



But any agreement between Palestinian and Israeli leaders will be worthless if it is not marketed properly to their general publics. Peace agreements that have no public support normally don’t stand the test of time. This means that agreements must first and foremost be fair and just, but also that they must include clear short- and medium-term provisions for improving the quality of life.



Every single Palestinian has suffered from the ongoing occupation. Travel restrictions, economic strangulations, house destructions and large-scale incursions must stop immediately. Prisoners must be released, and basic living conditions must be improved.



Palestinians will only throw their support behind a negotiated end to the conflict when they can taste the fruits of peace — a fact on the ground that American and Israeli leaders would do well to accept as they reinvolve themselves in seeking peace in the Middle East.

This is the BBC from London, Voice of America from Washington, Deutsche Welle from Germany, Monte Carlo Radio from France. According to Reuters, AP wire service, UPI news. This is CNN. You are watching the Disney Channel, Hollywood channel, History Channel. Tonight’s feature is The Terminator. Follow the latest episodes of The Bold and the Beautiful, Dallas, Friends, The Practice, NYPD Blue, Law and Order.

The above is a small sample of the barrage of media outlets and programs that fill every moment of every day for Arabs and Muslims. The powerful media outlets provide us with the news, chosen, directed, and spun by western media practitioners in New York, Washington, Atlanta, London, and Paris. Open any newspaper in cities like Cairo, Casablanca, or Islamabad and you will read more news and see more photos coming from western wire services than from any other.



We are also drenched with entertainment written and produced by creative talents from places like Hollywood and Orlando. These shows receive awards with names like Oscars and Emmys from cities like Los Angles, California and Cannes, France. View a television station in Riyadh, Algiers, or Manila, and you will no doubt see programs originally written in American English, about people living in American cities dealing with issues of interest to Americans. Attend any cinema hall in Amman, Beirut, or Jakarta, and you will see a flick staring blue-eyed, blonde white men or women crushing bad guys with black hair and brown eyes.

Western media in all its forms is a major import item in the Arab and Muslim worlds. This is not restricted to powerful media carriers (CNN, BBC, and Monte Carlo). Western media is also a major producer of fiction, as well as non-fiction content.



In a region that is very young (the majority of the population in the Arab and Islamic world is under 25), this modern cultural colonialism has created a huge desire to emulate the West. News and analysis from the western world is taken at face value, film stars are bigger than life, and fashion trends seen in movies and television quickly become adopted by a young, hero-less Arab and Muslim population.



What has happened to us? How did we find ourselves on this slippery slope? Where are the alternative media outlets, films, and heroes that reflect this region’s rich culture and traditions?

To answer these question we have to recognize that we are not in this problem alone. Western media hegemony is not restricted to the Arab and Muslim worlds, but is global. But where other regions, nations, and communities have realized this problem and have attempted to remedy it, our region continues to consume western culture without any reservations, hesitations, or efforts to look for other sources of strength within our own societies.



Part of the problem comes from political and military defeat. Many defeated nations are fascinated with their victors, and often study them ad nauseam. Blacks in South Africa knew their oppressive white minority government much better than the whites understood the majority black population. Palestinians know more about Israel and Israelis than the other way around. A look at how many people around the world speak English and how many English speakers speak another language supports this assumption.



To change this imbalance an extraordinary effort must be exerted to change the flow of information from the present flood of west to east, to a more equitable two- way relationship. There is no doubt that both east and west have a lot to offer each other. Lessening this asymmetry requires a multi-layered approach. The present western hegemony must be balanced with a serious attempt to get the peoples of the East to better represent themselves in the eyes of the West.

The twentieth century’s colonial policy of divide and rule has left its effect on media consumption. With the Arab and Muslim region divided and weak, the West has not only ruled it politically, but also in the media field. The media industry (and we should never forget that it is an industry) is expensive. Erecting powerful transmitters, creating quality programs, and supplying firsthand news is an expensive operation. Small countries are unable to compete with these multi-national conglomerates, thus leaving powerful media carriers a virtual monopoly on both media carriers and media content.



Arab and Muslim peoples have not only been divided and splintered, but they have also been cursed with undemocratic political regimes that have confiscated the popular will of their own people. These autocratic regimes have hijacked media and media content, forging it to fit their own political desires and ambitions of staying in power. Media ownership in the Arab world, has been almost totally in the hands of the ruling powers. Cultural production and other creative endeavors have also been hijacked to the degree that these artists have become mere cheer leaders to kings, emirs, presidents, and prime ministers.



The hegemony of western media has reached dangerous proportions and requires a strong, unified, and serious strategy. This strategy needs to work on two tracks. It must provide the peoples of the region with credible and independent media outlets and, at the same time, a unified effort must be exerted to begin the hard process of creating alternative media content that can be taken seriously by an ever skeptical public. Arabs have a major advantage over many other nations. All Arab nations speak, read, and understand the same language. For an independent media to develop, attention to professionalism is paramount. The success of the Arab network al-Jazeera has as much to do with the professionalism of its staff and their ability to work independently than any other factor.



The success of networks such as al-Jazeera, MBC, LBC, and al-Arabiya is also the result of smart Arab media entrepreneurs using modern technology and proven international media standards to produce quality television. Our search for a unique and independent media from that of the West need not reject the latest internationally available techniques and technologies developed in the West. We are not obliged to reinvent the wheel to produce genuine Arabic media. 

A strong Arab media also needs to pay attention to everything that is local and indigenous. When Arabs start looking inwardly in a critical way, the rest of the world will take both the Arab media and Arabs much more seriously. We can’t expect to participate in a serious dialogue with the West unless we first develop a genuinely independent media that pays attention to our own issues. Only when we have the courage and willingness to dialogue with each other, can we succeed in organizing a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Tuesday November 30th   2004

This week was scary and hard on the road. It began when I made a visit to some relatives who live in the old city of Ramallah. I had gone to deliver a package for them from Jordan and to pick up a package intended for a Jerusalem family who they can’t deliver because they  are not allowed into the city which has been annexed by Israel and therefore according to Israeli law Palestinians living outside the city are not allowed to visit it unless they have a permit (which is hard to obtain). As a Jerusalemite I am allowed into both worlds. The visit turned out long and before I knew it they insisted on me having dinner. They had been at our Amman home a week earlier and Salam, my wife had put out a big table so they wanted to at least feed me that evening. After dinner I walked out without paying much attention to the surroundings. I get in my car and start driving when I realize that the entire area I am in is electrified. Boys with stones are crowding on street corners and as I tried to drive I realize what their aim was, an Israeli army jeep was at the end of the street. I quickly back out and decide to use another road, again I notice another Israeli jeep at the end of that road, all of a sudden,  I am scared. It seems that I am surrounded with two well armed Israeli jeeps and I am on the side of the young boys. I consider parking the car and going back to the nice warm home I had just left, but there was no place to park the car now with stones in the street. I decide to turn the car off and wait. Sure enough a few minutes later I see cars coming from one of the roads and I quickly drive out and back into the normal streets of Ramallah. I go to the special check point normally referred to as DCO. I flash my Israeli-issued government press card and I am quickly allowed to go through the check point.

Thursday December 3, 2004

By 7pm we were done with our family duties. We walk out of the hospital and into the settlement streets. The carnival is over and as we approach our car to drive to Amman we are wondering how many other people in the region cross so many political and social borders within the same day and week. Less than ninety  minutes later we are at the Israeli crossing. As we get close, we call the Palestinian Israeli driver of the bus that drives across, he says hurry if you want to catch his bus. After parking the car I go to pay the exit tax (while Jonathan goes to the passport control). A group of Palestinian Israeli men are exchanging money and flirting with an Israeli woman of Moroccan backgrounds. Knowing that the bus is about to leave, I ask them to let me through and they can continue the chatting. They allow me to get the two exit tax receipts, and I run to the passport control. Within minutes we are done and on the waiting bus. By 10:20 that evening we are in our home in Amman eating

Salam’s Mlukhieh.